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This work tackles the question of the importance of design of international 
agreements on the compliance they elicit on all levels of the global trade regime. 
Discussing the international legal theories that underpin the different perspectives 
on this issue and scrutinizing case studies of both large and small treaties this 
thesis establishes the impact that elements of an agreement’s structure have on its 
aggregate success. A case study of the GATT/WTO system illustrates the 
challenges of scale and diversity of trade issues while the study of the OILPOL 
and MARPOL environmental pollution regimes presents a lens on the practical 
implementation of an agreement and the evolution of compliance resulting from 
adjustments to such elements of its architecture as the monitoring components and 
enforcement mechanism. By analyzing different scales of the international trade 
system this work seeks to thread particular challenges and lessons that disappear 
or emerge as one moves from the large system with multiple state actors and 
significant monetary consequences to a smaller focus where the burden of 
compliance falls on individual ship captains and harbor inspectors. By 
investigating the relationship between the state and the individual in compliance 
matters this work aims to contribute to the scholarship on the optimal path of 
bringing on the ground realities to diplomatic negotiations. This study carries 
lessons for the crafting of future international agreements by pointing out areas of 
concentration that prove most crucial to inducing compliance and offers 
suggestions for a better method of effectively putting into practice the actual 







IX. INTRODUCTION, BACKGROUND, AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 Should states be incentivized to action or threatened with punishment at the first 
sign of non-compliance? My research question asks if the nature of the enforcement 
mechanism of an international agreement significantly impacts states’ compliance with it. 
Enforcement mechanisms can be divided into many different types, each with its peculiar 
appeals and flaws. While at first it may appear that deterrence based mechanisms will 
elicit greater compliance, there are convincing examples of incentive mechanisms that 
show broad adoption and implementation. My thesis will explore the differences in these 
approaches to achieving the desired effect through international agreements and aim to 
determine in what ways the design of different systems impacts what ends up being 
implanted in reality over longer periods of time.  
 I predict that the design and structure of an international agreement directly 
impacts its success or failure. More specifically compliance with an agreement is likely a 
consequence of the ease of implementation, available resources, and the specificity and 
severity of the consequences of breaching it. Well designed, detailed, and practical 
agreements are likely to meet with high levels of compliance whereas vague and overly 
ambitious efforts likely permit the existence of loopholes that push enforcement into the 
area beyond the resources or will to comply of a state. The impact of design is likely 
comparable across a range of issues though the scale of specificity and effort must be 
proportionate to the scope of the task.  
 The debate over the type of enforcement mechanisms in international agreements 
is becoming increasingly important in a world without global government and yet one 
which necessitates a large number of governance regimes. With growing interdependence 
and the disputes that go with it the number of international agreements on all types of 
issues is skyrocketing. A better understanding of the effects that each type of mechanism 
has on the compliance with written agreements would contribute to the analysis of the 
best means of achieving the original purpose of the treaty, protocol, or other legal accord, 
and avoiding the often encountered pitfall of international agreement with no domestic 
compliance. How agreements are designed has crucial consequences for their eventual 
adoption.1 For this thesis I will use WTO agreements and compliance as a case study, in 
addition to Ronald Mitchell’s analysis of regime design.  
 My thesis will be organized according to the following framework: 
1. Introduction, background, and terms. 
a. Here I introduce the concepts to be researched and provide readers with a 
brief history of international agreements and the general trends of 
international law. This will be essential to the understanding of why my 
thesis is important and in which direction this research area will be 
heading in the future. Additionally I define terms, especially given 
complex and confusing methodology issues found in this area of research.  
2. Review of literature 
a. I give an overview of the available literature on this issue, aiming to 
provide a balanced review of the most recent scholarship and findings.   
3. Questions, assumptions, expectations. 
                                                          
1 Mitchell, Ronald B. “Regime design matters: international oil pollution and treaty compliance” 
International Organizations: A comparative Approach . Ed. Field, Werner J; Jordan, Robert S.; 
Hurwitz, Leon. 3rd edition. London. Praeger. 
a. In this section I present many of the questions that may arise as part of this 
study and also provide some of the justifications for pursuing methods of 
compliance up to this point. I also explore what assumptions those make 
and offer possible outcomes of my study. 
4. Competing theories and the nature of compliance. 
a. In this section I outline some of the theories currently being used to 
address treaty design and the various levels of compliance international 
agreements enjoy. Observing the evolution of international legal theory I 
attempt to discuss the nuanced differences to best explain the direction 
from which scholarship in this area comes from and what particular 
perspectives it may inherently take. 
5. GATT/WTO system case studies. 
a. This serves as my first case study, analyzing the nature of the dispute 
settlement mechanism in the WTO and what its structure means for the 
resolution of issues between member states. I am particularly interested in 
the design of the mechanism and what effect it bears on whether the 
disputes are settled, resolved, or remain open. I additionally explore what 
lessons, if any, are to be found in the compliance literature that tackles 
issues of this scope and if universal lessons can be drawn from it. 
6. Regime design and Ronald Mitchell’s work. 
a. My second case study deals with implementation and compliance on a 
smaller level, focusing on particular treaties and how their structure 
affected what took place on the ground. I am interested in the evolution of 
the design of the oil pollution treaties, the obstacles to their 
implementation and enforcement, and what devices within the treaties 
produced the effects most closely aligned with the original intentions of 
the agreements.  
7. Findings and conclusions. 
a. In the final section I pool my findings and show any trends I have 
discovered by demonstrating connections and drawing as clear as possible 
distinctions between the various models of eliciting compliance. 
 
Within the scope of this work several terms must be defined in order to reference 
particular cases with clarity. The broadest category I aim to use will be “international 
agreements” which I will use to describe both the kinds of documents that the term 
traditionally refers to but also additionally the consequences of treaties, namely court 
decisions and recommendations of bodies created from treaties and ones which are 
understood to be coming from some original international agreement. In those cases 
while a particular decision may not necessarily be accepted by a state if it is bound by 
treaty to recognize the decisions of the court or body I will nevertheless treat it the same 
way I would a state that is non-compliant with a provision of a treaty it has signed.  
I will also use the term “regime” according to Stephen Krasner’s definition of 
“[i]mplicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around 
which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations,” 
particularly with regards to norms found in industries (such as shipping or other forms of 
trade) and subsets of international agreements (such as environmental or trade 
agreements). Regime will not necessarily be legally binding, but depending on the case 
will form a general consensus norm that the vast majority of actors abide by. Fringe cases 
and outliers will, as much as possible, be given individual attention but due to the grey 
edged areas of some international regimes they may not always be helpful or 
representative of any significant value in their cases.  
For the purpose of this thesis, a “voluntary mechanism” will be defined as one 
characterized as a recommendation and not carrying enumerated consequences of non 
compliance. Such agreements, often termed “soft” law, usually function by utilizing 
diplomatic guarantees or national honor, and as such don’t carry measures of punishment 
other than a damaged reputation. Voluntary agreements are also routinely thin on 
monitoring mechanisms and for some states may end at a simple promise to undertake the 
goals of such an agreement at some point – hardly a useful implementation of what is 
international law. Such agreements are easier to reach and are the preferred means of 
reaching international agreements on the improvement of the standard of living, 
alleviation of poverty and often and unfortunately human rights.  
Mandatory mechanisms, conversely termed “hard” law, on the other hand carry 
specific stipulations and present often severe consequence of noncompliance. These may 
range from a loss of voting ability to sanctions or even outright military intervention. 
They tend to be lengthier and involve protracted negotiations by expert bodies and 
notoriously face difficulties in national ratification. Nevertheless they are the preferred 
means of dealing with economic and military matters as they demonstrate the necessary 
clarity for mutual understanding between all parties. Rarer and more difficult mandatory 
agreements are often praised for their high compliance rate but are not usually scrutinized 
in terms of the question of having been the best approach to resolving any particular 
problem. My research will try to determine where each of these mechanisms is applicable 
and whether the improved compliance with one justifies its use despite the various 
tradeoffs suffered during negotiations. Additionally l draw distinctions between 
compliance and effectiveness with the former placing focus on the meeting of guidelines 
or requirements of agreements, regardless of circumvention or dishonesty while the latter 
will determine the efficacy of agreement design on creating the change originally 
intended during the negotiations of the agreement. The difference is an important aspect 
of data analysis as many states take genuine measures to come into compliance but face 
circumstantial difficulties (like poverty or low governmental budgets) while others may 
come into compliance much more easily but choose not to behave in the spirit of the law 
in other areas.  
The definition of compliance presents the greatest challenge as it creates the 
greatest degree of problems in scholarship in this area. While a large variety of 
definitions exist for this term I have chosen to adopt the simplest, hoping that it will lead 
to the easiest determination of the existence or non existence of the effect that I’m 
researching. Compliance will mean the degree of effort made to meet the general 
intention of the agreement. Compliance will be high when states mobilize resources and 
demonstrate volition to achieve the agreed upon goals. It will conversely be low when 
little effort exists or violations blatantly persist despite the agreement.  
Further methodology will be discussed at a later point when I will include the 
different perspectives offered on the issue by the broad IR schools and draw distinctions 
between interests and goals. The realist and liberal schools offer substantially different 
explanations and I hope to find explanatory power in aspects of both and determine 
which of their conclusions prove most useful while being mindful of the assumptions 
contained by both and the explanatory pitfalls they represent. 
To best illustrate the argument that the type of enforcement mechanism matters 
significantly I have refined my selection of case studies to demonstrate compliance on the 
level of the state and the actual implementation of policy changes. My thesis focuses on 
the GATT/WTO compliance mechanism to illustrate choices on the international level 
where these agreements begin, and use international agreements on the conduct of oil 
shipping vessels for a more practical analysis of actual compliance on the very end of an 
agreement.2 By using both a macro and a micro level of analysis I am able to evaluate the 
strengths and weaknesses of each type of compliance and determine which produces 
meaningful results and at what rates.  
The GATT/WTO case study is uniquely crafted to study compliance in that it 
describes a case involving a similar member body, the same core issues (economic), 
within a system of similar legitimacy, over a statistically significant number of decades, 
and yet shows the differences of a shift between voluntary and mandatory enforcement. 
Before the WTO, GATT suffered from a 30% noncompliance rate (interestingly largely 
from democracies) but it could be argued that the negotiations were not as difficult 
without the pressure of a binding system. Upon the establishment of the WTO 
compliance rates have risen as a result of the consequences of not following the 
agreements but negotiations are now more prone to be stalled and the mandatory nature 
of the agreements as well as the dispute settlement process are highly controversial. 
                                                          
2 Stein, Arthur A., Why Nations Cooperate: Circumstance and Choice in International Relations. 
Ithaca, NY. Cornell University Press. 1990. 
Through my research I hope to identify the specific tradeoffs of each process and 
determine the usefulness of each scheme and its applicability to agreements outside of the 
WTO system.3 Through this study I also plan to analyze the incentives for particular state 
behavior to comply with the various mechanisms and determine what motivates them to 
do some. For this purpose I will use competing views of prestige, economic interest, 
regional power politics, etc. as various means of analysis.4  
Crucial to this case study is an analysis of the WTO dispute resolution mechanism 
and its effect on compliance rates. Through its three stages: consultation, litigation, and 
implementation the mechanism offers an interesting glimpse into what does and does not 
work within international negotiations. For example, the initial 60 day mandatory 
consultation period resolves 46% of disputes showing strong evidence that lengthier 
negotiations contribute to better understanding and would imply a stronger design for 
agreements. The system as a whole resolves approximately two thirds of disputes to the 
satisfaction of both sides, an encouraging statistic if it carried over to broad international 
law.  
This case study offers another important dimension of compliance, the difference 
between developing and developed countries, which I will discuss very briefly. It is often 
forgotten that the implementation of law is by no means an even playing field. Regardless 
of whether the issue is national costs of changing to comply or the ability to interpret the 
law there is a large gap between states in what happens after their representatives sign 
                                                          
3 Raustiala, Kal; Slaughter, Anne-Marie, “International Law, International Relations and 
Compliance” Handbook of International Relations. Ed. Carlsnaes, Walter; Risse, Thomas; 
Simmons, Beth A., London. Sage Publications. 2002. 
4 Simmons, Beth A., “International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in 
International Monetary Affairs” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 94, No. 4 (Dec 
2000), 819-835 
agreements. The WTO resolution process is legally intensive with protracted negotiations 
that require a substantial investment of both time and money in order to bring the 
expertise necessary to articulate and fight for the desired stipulations. Unfortunately 
many developing nations can’t afford full time WTO representation, not to mention full 
legal teams capable of effectively researching, analyzing, and arguing their cases. As the 
following table shows poor countries’ participation in the process is severely hampered5:  
 
Similarly, poor countries achieve full concessions from the negotiations in 40% of cases 
versus 75% for wealthy countries. Without being full participants in an international body 
where substantial amounts of money is at stake how can one expect poorer nations to 
fully engage in other international negotiations where outcomes are “merely” symbolic 
issues of human rights or education? This perspective on the issue should aid my 
                                                          
5 Busch, Marc L., and Eric Reinhardt (2003), “Developing Countries and GATT/WTO Dispute 
Settlement,” Journal of World Trade 37(4), pp. 719-735. 
argument that resources to participate and implement agreements are essential in a 
prudent design.  
For my second case study I plan on using Ronald Mitchell’s work on regime 
design for a more practical perspective on what specifically elicits compliance at the end 
of an international agreement. His analysis of the impact of regime design on 
effectiveness scrutinizes the case of agreements on the transport of oil and in particular 
the discharge of oil polluted water near harbors. He identifies this area as one where 
international agreement is difficult and yet his work shows that increasing transparency, 
the ability to create meaningful sanctions, lowering costs of compliance, and actively 
working on preventing compliance violations end up significantly altering compliance 
with agreements. The empirical studies on compliance of shipping vessels are useful in 
that they provide evidence of concrete actions being taken as a result of new international 
agreements. More importantly they demonstrate empirically which provisions of 
international law faced the greatest amounts of resistance and what shipping companies 
and states did to try to circumvent them. By incorporating this on-the-ground level of 
analysis I show that compliance is highly dependent on the costs and practical 
considerations of putting agreements into practice.6 
Mitchell’s study of the two subregimes for international oil pollution control raise 
interesting questions as to the determinants of action taken on the micro level in response 
to macro international demands. With the discharge subregime illustrating initial 
international efforts at controlling oil pollution and the subsequent equipment subregime 
demonstrating further efforts I will be able to analyze the particular effects of each and 
                                                          
6 Mitchell, Ronald B. “Regime design matters: international oil pollution and treaty compliance” 
International Organizations: A comparative Approach . Ed. Field, Werner J.; Jordan, Robert S.; 
Hurwitz, Leon. 3rd edition. London. Praeger. 
why some aspects worked while others didn’t. Mitchell’s findings that the compliance 
with the seemingly less politically and economically desirable subregime was actually 
higher should lead us to reconsider our assumptions about what method yields the best 
results.  
Mitchell’s conclusion that regime design impacts compliance serves as an 
important factor of analysis in my thesis. It is of particular importance for being at odds 
with conventional theories of hegemonic power and economic interest which fail to 
explain the variance in the adoption of the different subregimes. While competing 
theories can contribute to understanding the constraints of actor choices or what levels of 
compliance are possible (in other words a very poor country will never be able to comply 
with extravagantly expensive international demands) they simply do not fit the cases as 
well as regime design.  
Tracking the friction of compliance from the international agreements down to the 
practical implementation will allow me to determine which enforcement measures have 
the best rates of success and what design best serves to achieve the goals of those crafting 
the agreements in the first place. It’s clear that design matters but which ones and how 
much remains to be seen. There is a middle ground between lofty, broad 
recommendations that may result in zero change and small, precise measure that face no 
problems and carry big effects. Exactly what that middle ground is and which 
components from both extremes do and do not work will be determined by my thesis.  
I offer competing perspectives for what makes the difference with regards to 
particular agreements but will also incorporate broader IR theories and their implications 
for this analysis.7 I hope to discover whether the study of compliance shows a national 
intent in line with liberal views of cooperation and mutual understanding or if it falls 
under more simple national interests where actors predominantly negotiate for the results 
that most suit their national goals at the lowest cost. A debate of what prompts state 
actions and leads to international debate will be important in establishing if states go to a 
place like the WTO simply to maximize their gains from trade or if smoother, more 
efficient functioning of the system, or even ideological goals like environment 
considerations are ever important motivators for action.   
The GATT/WTO case study offers an idea of the degree of participation with 
both contentious and un-contentious agreements while the oil tankers production data 
should yield clear reactions to implementing both. These two case studies will provide a 
reference point for trade related agreements as a whole and demonstrate to what extent 
the structure of the agreement matters.8 Lastly, I hope to ascertain what level of 
satisfaction has been provided by the enforcement mechanism embedded within the 
WTO. By understanding their satisfaction with the process I hope to shed light on why 
states continue participating in the proceedings and whether they do so solely for selfish 
benefit or if they derive other benefits.  
I propose to demonstrate that the enforcement mechanism matters in compliance 
and effectiveness and that the ability of a mechanism to serve its purpose depends on the 
nature of the problem tackled. I plan to analyze the incentives to compliance and the 
                                                          
7 Raustiala, Kal; Slaughter, Anne-Marie, “International Law, International Relations and 
Compliance” Handbook of International Relations. Ed. Carlsnaes, Walter; Risse, Thomas; 
Simmons, Beth A., London. Sage Publications. 2002. 
8 Simmons, Beth A., “International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in 
International Monetary Affairs” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 94, No. 4 (Dec 
2000), 819-835 
 
tradeoffs of mandatory agreements and try to determine whether states value changing 
their way for the better significantly enough to warrant the delay of mandatory 
requirements for change. I aim for my thesis to provide a contribution to the discussion of 




















X. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
The literature I have used in my research focuses on four general areas and is 
reviewed accordingly below; those are: the work on international legal theories and 
compliance, Ronald Mitchell’s studies of the implementation of international 
environmental agreements, empirical and historical studies of the GATT/WTO decisions 
and mechanisms, and other scholarship on implementation and compliance.  
Simmons’ “Compliance with International Agreements”9 reviews alternative 
perspectives  to realism to determine if and how they contribute to understandings why 
compliance exists in the international sphere. The three alternative perspectives are 
rational functionalism, domestic regime-based explanations, and normative approaches 
and the piece outlines their premises while discussing the difficulties of both 
methodology and study in the area of compliance. Covering seminal authors in each 
school of international relations theory Simmons gives a concise but informative 
overview of the variable approaches to scholarship of this issue.  
 Further, Simmons’ “Capacity, Commitment, and Compliance: International 
Institutions and Territorial Disputes”10 elaborates on the conceptual framework of 
compliance in the realm of territorial disputes. While for the purpose of this thesis 
territorial issues are treated as having a different nature than trade matters11 this article 
                                                          
9 Simmons, Beth A. “Compliance with International Agreements.” Annual Review of Political 
Science. 1998. I:75-93. 
10 Simmons, Beth A. “Capacity, Commitment, and Compliance: International Institutions and 
Territorial Disputes.” Journal of Conflict Resolution. Vol.46. No. 6. December 2002. 829-856 
11 There are numerous reasons for this, chiefly that territory is more easily quantifiable and 
monitored than economic practices which need substantially different mechanisms and thus often 
offers a good analysis of the two level nature of decision making and enforcement, as 
well as giving a good treatment to the matter of national prestige – a difficult to measure 
variable that makes up a substantial component of the system of international legitimacy. 
The role of legal institutions and their contributions to domestic foreign policy decision 
making is also discussed here. Lastly, the article relates to my arguments by drawing a 
link between trade and territorial disputes and gives treatment to the historical evolution 
of arbitration of these cases.  
 I  use Simmons’ and Hopkins’ “The Constraining Power of International Treaties: 
Theory and Methods”12 to evaluate the empirical dimension of the study of compliance 
and build on this research in conjunction with Jana von Stein’s previous work on a model 
addressing the question of whether treaty agreements simply reflect underlying state 
preferences. This article provides a thorough discussion of both methodology and 
variable analysis and is instrumental to the assessment of any quantifiable aspects of this 
study. The impact found trough the correlation of several variables is the groundwork for 
my determination of important elements of my thesis.  
 Similarly, “International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance 
in International Monetary Affairs”13 discusses reasons for state compliance with trade 
regulations, the role and scope of the enforcement mechanism, and the elements of state 
prestige. Quantitative studies of compliance with Article VIII of the International 
                                                                                                                                                                             
yield different rates of compliance. More on this subject will be explored in the discussion of 
compliance theories.  
12 Simmons, Beth A., Hopkins, Daniel J. “The Constraining Power of International Treaties: 
Theory and Methods” The American Political Science Review. Vol 99. No. 4. Nov. 2005. 623-
631 
13 Simmons, Beth A. “International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in 
International Monetary Affairs.” American Political Science Review. Vol. 94. No. 4. December 
2000. 819-835 
Monetary Fund are used to support the argument that international regulations carry a 
substantial impact on the choices of states, at least in the financial areas. Chiefly, the 
impact of compliance from regional blocs is scrutinized here with particularly attention 
paid to the rates of compliance based on the actions of neighboring states and the types of 
governments in question.  
 I use Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink’s discussion of international norms 
in “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change”14 to refine methodology and 
discuss the evolution of political norms in international institutions and how their creation 
impacts the perspective with which states often approach international law. Finnemore 
and Sikkink argue that the disparity in scholarship between “what the world is” and 
“what it ought to be” shapes how norms are understood and adopted in both academia 
and international relations in practice. This will serve as a basis for my analysis of the 
competing views of compliance and their possible change in light of the shifting realities 
of the world.  
 Kal Raustiala’s “Form and Substance in International Agreements”15 translates 
much of the work on norm creation into a discussion on the types of and reasons for 
international agreements. Giving treatment to the historical role of formal agreements in 
all strata of cooperation Raustiala dissects their structure, legality, and substance of such 
norms. Of particular interest here is the analysis of the functional and liberal views in 
international relations theory and the identification of the essential trade off inherent in 
                                                          
14 Finnermore, Martha; Sikkink, Kathryn “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change” 
International Organization. Vol. 52. No. 4 Autumn, 1998. 887-917 
15 Raustiala, Kal “Form and Substance in International Agreements” The American Journal of 
International Law. Vol. 99. No. 3. Jul. 2005. 581-611. 
cooperation. This article, while inconclusive, has been helpful in providing a wealth of 
research questions and proposing some of the strengths and weaknesses of analysis 
through particular theoretical lenses.  
 More historical perspectives can be drawn from Oscar Schachter’s “The Twilight 
Existence of Nonbinding International Agreements”16 which contains an older, but 
valuable perspective on the reasons why states choose binding and non-binding systems 
of international cooperation and what the expected compliance with each might be. In 
light of the nonbinding nature of some of the agreements Schachter asks if states may 
consider those outside of international law, an important determination when studying 
compliance within the increasingly accepted, in some ways, norms that any kind of 
agreement between two state actors may constitute a contract and thus law.  
 I extensively use the work of Abram and Antonia Handle Chayes17 on both the 
theories of compliance as related to the concept of sovereignty and the treaty process with 
a step by step analysis of the data reporting, verification and monitoring, and 
management. The historical explanation of the evolution of international legal theory is 
an important background to the understanding of why states behave in particular ways in 
the international arena and what may be done to induce action from such actors.   
 To further assess the above research and supplement it with other competing 
theories I will make use of Harold H. Koh’s extensive review of Chayeses’ work18.  
                                                          
16 Schachter, Oscar “The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding International Agreements” The 
American Journal of International Law. Vol 71. No. 2 Apr. 1977. 296-304 
17 Chayes, Abram and Chayes, Antonia Handler (1995) The New Sovereignty: Compliance with 
International Regulatory Agreements, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press  
18 Koh, Harold H. “Review: Why Do Nations Obey International Law?” The Yale Law Journal. 
Vol. 106. No. 8. Jun 1997. 2599-2659. 
Tackling the question of why nations obey international law Koh begins with a general 
overview of the problem of sovereignty and forced compliance. He then follows the 
historical changes in the fluctuating struggle between the desire to cooperate and stick to 
agreed upon principles and the need to both establish self reliance and reaffirm 
sovereignty. Koh surveys a valuable breadth of literature on the subject and gives several 
perspectives on what, in practice, appears to be the impetus in compliance, whether it is 
the fear of sanctions or the loss of prestige. 
 The first case study I use for measuring compliance consists of the broad 
overview of cases within the GATT/WTO system and the extent to which international 
agreements yielded effective compliance on the relevant matters. For historical 
background and the general trends in the GATT/WTO system I use The Evolution of the 
Trade Regime19, profiling the origins, evolution, and mechanisms of the system and their 
place in international law. The book contains a thorough discussion of the process of 
negotiations in the GATT/WTO and sheds light on the degree to which individual state 
preferences are reflected in the final agreements that are negotiated. By going into the 
details of the political logic and institutional rules of the process it makes it possible to 
gain a greater understanding of the successes and failures of the specific cases of 
negotiations.  
 To further understand the negotiating process (before the dispute resolution 
mechanism) I draw on cases of the European Community’s interactions within the WTO 
and the different institutional preferences for how the cases have been handled. J. H. H. 
                                                          
19 Barton, John H., Goldstein, Judigh L.., Josling, Timothy E., Steinberg, Richard H. The 
Evolution of the Trade Regime: Politics, Law, and Economics of the GATT and the WTO, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. 2006.  
Weiler’s The EU, the WTO, and the NAFTA20 discusses commonalities and differences 
in trade negotiations on the regional and global levels and analyzes what is lost and 
gained in the process at each stage. Of particular note is the case of environmental 
regulation which finds vastly different standards depending on which states and on what 
level the subject is considered.  
 After the overview of the GATT/WTO system negotiations and issues I will make 
use of several articles for a close examination of the WTO’s dispute settlement process, 
an area that should shed the most light on what the body determines and what the 
eventual compliance is. Work in this area by Jackson, Hudec, and Davis, condensed into 
“The Role and Effectiveness of the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism”21 contains 
several recent cases between the larger members of the WTO and frames the issues of 
compliance in terms of both methodology and the desired effects. The subsequent 
critique by Hudec and Davis provides additional takes on the questions proposed by 
Jackson (does the mechanism work?). This discussion is further supplemented by the 
open dialogue regarding multilateral trade negotiations between these and other scholars 
at a much earlier meeting of the American Society of International Law. In tandem they 
offer a slice of the understanding of where the most contentious areas of the dispute 
mechanisms and the compliance with its conclusions lie and how they have changed as 
the GATT system evolved into the WTO.22 
                                                          
20 Weiler, J. H. H. The EU, the WTO, and the NAFTA: Towards a Common Law of International 
Trade, Oxford University Press. Oxford. 2000.  
21 Jackson, John H., Hudec, Robert E., Davis, Donald “The Role and Effectiveness of the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Mechanism” Brookings Trade Forum. 2000. 179-236. 
22 Herzstein, Robert E., Hudec, Robert E., Graham, Thomas R., Jackson, John H., DeKieffer, 
Donald E., Gadbaw, Michael “Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Dispute Settlement” Proceedings 
 In order to determine any present differences between compliance from ordinary 
negotiations and the decisions of the dispute settlement panel I will use “To Settle or 
Empanel? An Empirical Analysis of Litigation and Settlement at the World Trade 
Organization”23 which covers the cost benefit analysis of quick, though imperfect 
adoption as opposed to prolonged negotiations under the dispute settlement panel. Most 
importantly, this study breaks down the statistics for compliance based on government 
type, which may be an important determinant of eventual adoption of the agreed upon 
decisions. Similarly, an analysis of the type of issue being discussed, whether it’s an 
easily quantifiable and divisible type or more of an all-or-nothing issue plays an 
important role in what type of agreement is reached and what the end result of that 
agreement may be.  
 Further work on this issue studies the disparity of power in the WTO and how it 
may affect what kind of state preferences make up the eventual agreement. “Power Plays 
& Capacity Constraints: The Selection of Defendants in WTO Disputes”24  looks at the 
number and kind of cases presented by smaller WTO members and how they fare in the 
dispute settlement process. This issue is directly linked to the compliance of those 
members due to the strong hypothesis that compliance may be directly related to the 
capacity to comply far more than any political will or ability to negotiate details.   
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23 Guzman, Andrew; Simmons, Beth A. “To Settle or Empanel? An Empirical Analysis of 
Litigation and Settlement at the World Trade Organization” Journal of Legal Studies. January 
2002. 205-234 
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 Lastly, I will address the issue of the contribution of large international 
agreements to compliance as a whole by looking at Edward D. Mansfield and Eric 
Reinhardt’s “Multilateral Determinants of Regionalism: The Effects of GATT/WTO on 
the Formation of Preferential Trading Agreements”25 which debates whether large trading 
blocs force states to pursue regional solutions that more closely represent both their 
capacities and interests. Preferential agreements and discriminatory trading practices may 
not fit the general world trade agenda but nevertheless  deserve study for the lessons they 
may yield for compliance and structuring and to discover to what extent the design of 
these agreements reflects particular preferences rather than more universal goals.  
The second major case study I use in this thesis focuses on Ronald B. Mitchell’s 
work on regime design26 27. Mitchell’s work focuses on environmental treaties with a 
particular focus on those governing oil tankers and shipping. In his study, Mitchell 
looked at compliance with agreements on the ground, paying close attention to what 
effects were yielded through each kind of mechanism included in the agreement. Looking 
at the different means of eliciting compliance this work provides valuable resources in 
terms of the variation between inducing states towards change and coercive action taken 
as a result of established non compliance. Conversely to the GATT/WTO case this study 
focuses heavily on smaller actors that collectively drive state attitudes towards these 
issues. Industrial opinions stemming from the costs that individual companies bear 
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provides important clues as to why compliance may or may not find adoption on the 
ground in practical terms despite whatever may happen in the meetings on the 
international level.   
Lastly, Jose Alvarez’s work gives a survey of the competing theories on 
compliance and the problems in recent scholarship of this issue. Alvarez addresses both 
questions of scope and perspective and offers interesting insights into why compliance 
studies may result in particular outcomes and to what extent they are dependent on 











                                                          
28 Alvarez, Jose E. “Measuring Compliance” Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the American 
Society of International Law. Vol. 96. March 13-16, 2002. 209-213 
XI. QUESTIONS, ASSUMPTIONS, EXPECTATIONS 
 
 My main research question is: does the type of structure of an international 
agreement affect how often and to what degree it is complied with? My research 
generally focuses on the reasons for the way current international agreements are 
designed, the reasons for that design, and the eventual success or failure of different types 
of design. Particularly I am interested in the question of deterrence and inducement based 
agreements and whether they yield disparate results in compliance. Through the analysis 
of the negotiations of trade agreements I aim to understand why a state may pursue a 
regional, international, mandatory, or voluntary character to the instrument being created 
and whether those preferences seem to indicate a general belief in selfish maximum gains 
or rather follow a different logic, such as common good, or perhaps different benefits 
derived from cooperation with other states.  Whether agreements simply reflect 
individual state preferences is difficult to study but I will attempt to do so using current 
scholarship on preferences. Additionally I look at what constitutes compliance, the 
methods through which it is measured, and the ways it is statistically represented. I also 
give treatment to the question of state size and representation in the GATT/WTO system 
and to what degree smaller states are adequately represented in the crafting of 
agreements. Lastly, I hope to establish where the impetus for international trade 
agreements originates within a state, whether they are industry-driven preferences that 
have to do with company profit, or political preferences detached from an identifiable 
specific profit motivation.  
 There are several obstacles to broad assumptions in this field of study. For one, 
rational choice theory would dictate that the motivations of states or industry are driven 
by fairly simple maximization efforts, states would pursue power and industries would 
pursue profit, relatively similar concepts. However, as we are unable to determine the 
detailed calculus of particular economic and political choices it is difficult to establish 
what a preference for a particular decision is based on. For example, it is impossible to 
determine whether a particular company is supportive of an international decision on 
trade in its industry out of clear, quantifiable reasons, or perhaps because it sees some 
change as inevitable and would rather choose a policy contrary to its profit now in favor 
of gaining reputation or profits from public image in the future. In exactly the same way a 
small state may demonstrate certain preferences in order to bargain on other issues more 
relevant to its industries or interests. For the purpose of these studies I will assume that 
industries are driven primarily by bottom line profit motivations while states, at least in 
so far as less public trade negotiations go, aim for the most economically beneficial 
return on their own predominant industries, i.e. a country will negotiate fervently on corn 
if it has a large corn industry and significantly less so if it does not. This opens the door 
to studying compliance by observing cases where a country has to comply with a 
preference it did not favor, begging the question: to what extent are states complicit in 
non compliance in protest of a norm they do not see as legitimate or adequate, or simply 
one that is not in their interest to support. Further, I will make the assumption that all 
actors present in negotiations are aware of the same information and are adequately 
represented. This creates a problem for small states which I will show as having often 
inadequate budgets. However, as it is impossible to determine whether a state deems its 
representation satisfactory or not I will work under the judgment that when present a state 
considers itself aware of the issues and acting in its self interest.  
 Perhaps the largest assumption I need to make in this study is one that has to do 
with the honesty of states with regards to implementation and compliance. It is often 
impossible to determine how genuinely a state desires to implement an agreement within 
its own territory. However, as scholars generally do not have access to data on the 
capacity committed to a particular agreement by a government it is necessary to assume 
that a signed agreement will be one that a state does its best to adopt, while an adopted 
agreement is one where a state will do its best to implement. Malevolent and secretive 
compliance evasion, i.e. one that is not brought before an international court or raised at 
some level of open negotiations, must be assumed to exist only to an insignificant degree 
or else it buckles not just the system of international trade agreements but rather trust and 
cooperation in the international system as a whole. This assumption does not stand at the 
microeconomic level where the choices of particular companies or industries are taken to 
exploit regulations to the maximum (and often beyond) exhibiting behavior as close as 
possible to the legal line that their preference takes them to. Accordingly companies are 
assumed to not disobey law on purpose but may do so to some degree in their 
misinterpretation of the law or the degree of its applicability and how firmly it is to be 
followed29.  
                                                          
29 Profit maximizing behavior carries with it an implicit incentive to exploit the system for 
maximum gain making it difficult to establish the following of laws as a solid rule. As can be 
seen in countless cases of economics individual companies will work to exploit tax codes, 
regulations, and other loopholes in the system. However, as the vast majority of those cases 
remain within the law, or at the very minimum within some degree of reasonable legal discussion, 
it can only be assumed that legal obedience is a broadly followed function of the international 
trade regime.  
 I expected that my study would yield a clear result for the type of compliance for 
the two main categories of international agreements – mandatory and voluntary. In this 
area I expected that compliance with mandatory agreements will be higher but it is 
difficult to ascertain how this will change when I adjust the interoperation of results for 
the category of the issue treated in each case. I expected that on economic issues 
compliance should be good given that the repercussions for not following the agreement 
can be a severe loss of profit. On other issues, beyond the scope of this work, I expected 
that compliance with a mandatory agreement on, for example, disarmament will be low 
whereas a voluntary agreement might be less ambitious and thus complied with more 
frequently. I expect that most states see trade agreements as significantly beneficial to 
their agendas and that in general whatever trade-offs they sustain they elicit a positive 
return on participation in the international trade regime. For this reason I think levels of 
non-compliance that can be identified as those where failure occurs due to the conflict of 
state preferences and the decision of the international panel to be low and that states 
usually do in fact do their best to implement agreements. However, in terms of capacity I 
expect that neither states, nor industries commit sufficient capacity to compliance efforts 
due to high costs. This may not be a reflection of how seriously an agreement is treated 
but simply that there is often a significant gap between those elements of diplomatic 
representation responsible for negotiations and the elements of a state responsible for the 
monitoring and enforcement of such agreements.  I would additionally predict that 
agreements that most clearly stipulate monitoring mechanisms have the best rates of 
compliance. Those mechanisms must be easy to implement and cost effective, addressing 
the predicted shortfall in capacity to enforce, thus the design of the structure of the 

















XII. THEORIES OF LAW AND COMPLIANCE 
 
 Recent decades have seen a significant uptick in scholarship regarding 
international law and subsequently its effects on state behavior. Studies have ranged from 
sweeping, generalized work aiming to establish the common denominator of which law 
works and which doesn’t to specific case studies carefully scrutinizing particular facets of 
systems, such as the effectiveness of decisions of the IMF. Methodology has been a great 
obstacle with unclear and often undefined differences between the measurements of 
implementation, compliance, and effectiveness that make it difficult to establish just what 
a particular scholar is measuring and to what extent it is an improvement or simplification 
of previous work.  As a result of this increasing competition problems have erupted with 
scholars scrutinizing the objectivity or credibility of each other’s models of study, 
particularly between empiricists looking at hard data and those taking a more theoretical 
approach.30  
 The bulk of the arguments stem, unsurprisingly, from divergent views of the place 
of the state in the international system and the degree to which it either positively or 
negatively responds to incentives or whether it is more of a norm abiding creature aware 
of more complex issues. Regardless of what a scholar’s perspective is on the international 
system and the character of the state it is irrefutable that some sort of international 
interaction exists and that regardless of causality or correlation at least some international 
agreements are complied with. Whether that constitutes coincidence, as an oversimplified 
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realist might say, or law, as an oversimplified liberal might claim is a question that 
requires a contemplation of the reasons why international norms exist, as well as why, 
and how they are created.  
 Harold Koh31, Abram and Antonia Handler Chayes32, and Thomas Franck’s33 
work on sovereignty and international agreements does a lot to show the evolution of 
scholarship on this issue since the 1970s when Louis Henkin made the bold assertion in 
his work How Nations Behave34 that “almost all nations observe almost all principles of 
international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time.” The question 
of why obey international agreements is closely connected to the question of the power of 
international norms and the sovereignty of the state, all central to international relations 
theory and far beyond the scope of this discussion.  
 The will or duty to honor agreements can be identified from several historical 
sources. Be they the “law of nature,” or honor, or the sanctity of promises due to a moral 
obligation legal theory mainly evolved in that with time more and more emphasis was 
placed on the process of establishing norms within the Grotian “international society.” 
Whereas the pre-Westphalian concept of law was more concerned with a moral, divine, 
or universal system, after 1648 customary state practice took over in the establishing of 
rules between states.  Subsequently legal obligation arose as a concept of behavior in line 
with custom and emerging norms, in opposition to something that was purely done 
voluntarily by a state, thus laying the ground work for the idea of obligation out of 
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previously granted consent to comply. Legal positivism, under Thomas Hobbes, asked for 
causal explanations as to why nations obeyed and concluded that as no sovereign existed 
on a world scale then these customs could not be law as they were unenforced. Immanuel 
Kant’s work in opposition to this idea called for greater interdependence as a possible 
route to global peace, arguing that the connections that bound states together would make 
war less likely due to the increasing costs of such a course of action. Meanwhile, Jeremy 
Bentham, who coined the term “international law” put forward a proposal for a codified 
system of international laws, arising out of custom, and progressing into an established 
system governed by a solid system of courts.  
 As a result of these developments four general perspectives on compliance with 
law emerged. The realist perspective on international law argued that given the absence 
of the global authority, and thus few concrete means of punishing non-compliance 
international law did not truly exists and was thus never fully obeyed, instead being 
followed rather coincidentally. The second cut, coalesced around Hobbes and termed 
rationalistic, proposed that states followed laws when they found them in alignment to 
their preferences and that while they did derive benefit from such a situation there was 
little incentive to go against their own preference for the sake of compliance. The 
Kantian, liberal, perspective firmly rejected zero sum theories and focused on the benefits 
of cooperation where law was not only guided by mutual benefits but, more importantly, 
by moral principles of justice and fairness. The fourth perspective, process-based, looked 
to the interactions with other states as the motivation to establish mutual norms and law  
judging the engagement of multiple parties as something that brought them together and 
encouraged a greater depth of cooperation and mutual understanding.  
 While the process based approach, encompassing the idea of prestige gained from 
cooperation, gathered steam in the early to mid 20th century the Cold War created new 
realities for international norms and any future envisioned for them. Realism gained at 
the expense of other perspectives and despite the existence of a newly formed system of 
international institutions with much promise the governing politics of the two 
superpowers left little room for ideas of international standards, and even less of any kind 
of enforcement against the wishes of those same superpowers that wrote most of the 
rules. This trend, in which realists saw international law as too utopian,  also created a 
separation between the studies of international relations and international law with one 
focused much more clearly on the bipolar system of power while the latter looked at 
defining norms and finding universal commonalities in legal practice among the states.35   
 Two schools of advocacy of international law emerged in the US, the New Haven 
School of International Law, rooted in legal realism and arguing that the legal process 
itself is decisionmaking representing the application of policy to reflect both the need for 
order and social choices, and the International Legal Process School, which also stressed 
process but did not see international law as something separate, viewing it instead as the 
undetermined intersection of the work of legal scholars and policy makers, without a life 
of its own. While the two schools encompassed most of the scholars researching the issue 
of compliance neither really addressed the underlying question of why nations comply 
with international law or how often they do. Nevertheless, the divergent orientations of 
the two camps made it possible to foster continuing debate on the subject and formed the 
basis for further investigation into the issue of compliance.  
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 As the 1970s and 80s increasingly brought the spotlight onto international norms 
and institutions more political scientists began admitting that evidently whatever 
international law was it did contribute to compliance by making dispute resolution 
possible, by allowing states dialogue in which they could signal their preferences, and by 
opening up space for the providing of information on compliance within the sphere of 
this dialogue. However, despite this advancement the often avoided terms reminiscent of 
a real study of international law, choosing instead to focus on everything international 
law consisted of without explicitly identifying it as such. Thus “principles, norms, rules, 
and decision making procedures” featured in a lot of study but were held to be entirely 
functional benefits of cooperation between states as opposed to something stemming 
from the power of norms on their own.36 Work on compliance by Robert Fisher did a lot 
to correct this imbalance and brought the analysis of international law back into serious 
scholarship. Thomas Franck’s more recent work37 follows in this vein presenting the 
reason why powerful states follow “powerless” rules as being “because they perceive the 
rule and its institutional penumbra to have a high degree of legitimacy” further defining a 
norm’s legitimacy as “its rule clarity or determinacy; its symbolic validation by rituals 
and other formalities its  conceptual coherence; and its adherence to right process, or 
conformity with the organized normative hierarchy of the international rule system.” 
However, this approach was criticized by scholars like Robert Keohane who did not 
recognize the connection between legitimacy and compliance, and who was joined in his 
criticism by other scholars from a variety of schools of legal theory. 
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 Following the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
international law scholarship entered a phase of uncertainty as the existing schools had to 
come to grips with the altered power structure and the emergence of trade agreements 
like the conclusion of the Uruguay round of the GATT, NAFTA, and the consolidation of 
the EU. With sovereignty diminished through these agreements international law took 
center stage and became a mixture of several legal theories attempting to move beyond 
simple ratification and into a sphere of increased legitimacy. This new system has been 
characterized by:  
…new channels opening for the interpretation of international and 
domestic law through judicial decision, legislation and executive action. 
New forms of dispute resolution, executive action, administrative 
decionmaking and enforcement, and legislation have emerged as part of a 
transitional legal process that influences national conduct, transforms 
national interests, and helps constitute and reconstitute national 
identities.38  
 
The treatment of compliance in this new system has been categorized into four strands, 
each rooted in some previous historical perspective on the issue. 
 The first, rationalist, reiterates the familiar idea of compliance with international 
law due to the state preferences it already reflects. In this approach, argued by scholars 
like Robert Keohane39, there is a comprehensive and highly complex idea of a long term 
state preference for gains which states craft in the system of cooperation. Based on 
repeated prisoner’s dilemma experiments these states are supposed to have figured out 
that cooperation presents them with the greatest return over a long period of time and 
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thus have become invested in the tweaking of the norms which inherently already 
represent their original choices. 40  
 The second, sometimes called “liberal” strand, characterized by the recognition of 
the capacity of rules to impact state behavior and modify it in ways that do not 
necessarily fully reflect that state’s original preference. Scholars like Andrew Moravcsik 
and Anne Marie Slaughter pay particular attention to the domestic politics of the state in 
question under the belief that the nature of the government is correlated with the degree 
to which it will comply with international norms. As Koh points out, this is a reinvention 
of the Kantian idea of “democracies don’t fight other democracies” instead suggesting 
that “democracies participate in legal agreements with other democracies” because the 
costs of resolving their disputes through simple adjudication will be order of magnitude 
smaller than any alternatives.  
 The third major strand, constructivist, argues that international law is falsely 
perceived as norms and ideas seen “out there” when in reality states and societies are 
products of existing norms. Because societies are already constructed out of 
commonalities, be they religious, philosophic, or other types of ideational they determine 
what states are and form a crucial role in what their self identities consist of. This strand, 
also connected to Grotian and English School traditions, maintains that by nature the 
international system is beneficial to the states established in it which in turn derive 
benefit from repeated observance of the agreed upon rules.  
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 The last strand, focusing on process, is built on a mixture of concepts all 
stipulating that the interaction of states in the international system shapes their 
preferences and results in compliance. This idea is built on the previously mentioned 
work of Abram and Antonia Handler Chayes41 as well as Thomas Franck42 and Harold 
Koh’s43 which each argues a slightly different dimension. Because of the suggested 
explanatory strength of this approach the subtle differences in compliance models of the 
three camps within this strand are worth exploring and critiquing.  
 Chayeses compliance work focused on treaties on arms control and the 
environment and aimed to show the success or failure of regimes established by treaties 
and an explanation for why each occurred. They identify efficiency, national interest, and 
regime norms as the three key areas to determining compliance faulting imprecise 
language, limited capacity, and implementation delays as the chief causes of failures of 
agreements.  Their “management” model of compliance sees states motivated to 
compliance due to their interaction with their peers. The peers can expose non-compliant 
behavior producing shame and diminishing the standing of the state in the eyes of the 
international system. Under this idea, no matter the costs of complying with some 
agreement, they must not be as grave as the standing and power lost through the 
international system. Because the system is interactive reasons for non compliance can be 
presented in front of international panels or be discussed among interested parties, 
leading to a dispute settlement process. Lastly, should the reason prove legitimate in the 
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eyes of the peer states the norm or law itself can be restated. Accordingly, the managerial 
model permits the application of norms to the international system while internalizing the 
resolution of its problems and subjects itself to continual rephrasing and evolution. This 
also paves the way for the involvement of non-state actors like civil society and 
international organizations which are given tools such as data collection, monitoring, and 
strategic review to keep another check on state compliance with agreements.44 
 Harold Koh identifies four flaws in this model. First, the managerial model asserts 
a judge-like figure in the dispute resolution process among states. While present in 
domestic law as a result of the court system structure the international society does not 
have any such figure with the comparable power. Whereas it can be argued that an 
international judge could always have the power of sanctions it is neither similar to the 
power of a judge in domestic disputes nor does it yield credibility to a model which 
means to have interaction among states resolve issues. In this way the model appears 
almost utopian, arguing essentially (and in an oversimplified manner) that states are 
always capable of agreeing and working out their problems. Secondly the model assumes 
loss of prestige due to non compliance but Koh points out that this is more specifically 
only true when there is no dispute over the interpretation of what the treaty was meant to 
encompass. It may be true that a state will appear hypocritical or weak if it backtracks on 
an agreement it voluntarily signed but suppose it simply makes the case that it did not see 
it the same way, a perfectly reasonable opinion on the legality of a document. In this 
situation, ideally, the matter would enter the dispute settlement process, but if a state 
chose not to it could linger in the grey area of reinterpretation for an undetermined period 
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of time without suffering the loss of or diminished standing from blatant violation and 
non compliance. 45 Third, the model does not fully address the issue of “true” state 
preferences. As mentioned previously in the methodology this is an area where certain 
assumptions have to be made to make the quantitative study of compliance possible. 
While the Chayses similarly work under the assumption that states mean what they say 
and sing agreements they wish to follow there is realistically much left to be desired in 
cases where states do little to internalize the norms they agreed to on the international 
level. Regardless of how genuine the effort on the diplomatic side, norms that never 
percolate to domestic executive, legislative, or judicial actions do little to bring true norm 
incorporation to the practical areas that treaties generally seek to target. Lastly, it makes 
the assumption that there are commonalities in all treaties that make them equally fair, 
enforceable and open to discourse. While the interactive process is meant to iron out a lot 
of these details it is unreasonable to expect issues like human rights to meet with the 
same global consensus as for example trade regulation. What elements comprise a 
legitimate or fair treaty, one that is fully subject to the interactive process and not 
something that a state might reject or give up on outright?  
 To address this question it’s helpful to turn to the analysis of legitimacy and 
compliance by Thomas Franck. He argued that there exists a correlation between the 
fairness/legitimacy of the rules and compliance. Franck maintains a quasi rationalistic 
perspective at once recognizing the existence of calculated cost benefit rational choice 
model while relying heavily on the concept of compliance “peer pressure” in the 
international system. Because of the importance of interaction with the other states, 
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process becomes once again the focus in this model seeing discourse and negotiation as 
the key elements to the state determination of the fairness and subsequently legitimacy of 
the agreement. Despite these explanatory strengths this argument lacks clarity on the 
exact end game of legitimacy vs. justice debate 46 and does not provide helpful 
explanations on how norms are internalized by states.47  
 An interesting test of these theories is presented by Koh in the form of the 1972 
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty between the US and the USSR. In order to proceed with the 
“Star Wars” program the Reagan administration proposed to reinterpret the treaty which 
over the course of eight years saw debate in the public and private spheres of discourse, 
from Congressional hearings to newspaper articles. The Reagan, and subsequently Bush, 
administrations maintained that their legal reinterpretation of the treaty was fair and 
correct until 1993 when the Bush administration finally chose to abandon the 
reinterpretation on the grounds of improved cooperation rather than an error of 
reinterpretation. One could argue, as Koh does, that in the late 1980s  the United States 
effectively violated the treaty under the guise of reinterpretation and as the matter never 
reached any kind of a court or adjudication some of the theories of international law and 
compliance outlined previously fall miserably short of their aims when viewed in the 
Cold War context. Koh argues that theories are highly complementary, each with 
weaknesses but on aggregate find explanatory power similar to what the three images do 
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for Kenneth Waltz’s argument for neorealism – different levels that interact with each 
other to explain behavior. The rationalistic interest theory may oversimplify matters by 
condensing everything into plus and minus matters open to miscalculation and while it 
finds room to explain trade and disarmament matters where the pieces of the puzzle come 
in the currency of numbers it fails in human rights and environmental agreements that 
don’t deal specifically with quantities or easily agreed upon numeric values. The liberal 
cut is on the other hand somewhat ignorant of the impermanent nature of government and 
offers explanations only in a snapshot when a country is or is not liberal, not accounting 
for shifts in national governance like states that fall back into dictatorship or grow apart 
or unevenly in democratic progress from their peers. This theory does not quite account 
for the reciprocal power of international norms themselves, which may (from the 
constructivist position) impact the states as much as they are originally reflective of their 
values and preferences. It has been argued that international norms on trade and shipping 
have existed for centuries in a decent state of governance regardless of the character of 
the state that engaged in it. Ships of commerce were received equally in progressive as in 
authoritarian countries for hundreds of years without any codified agreements or anything 
beyond customary practice. While constructivism accounts for the power of the 
international norms and how it impacts states but it doesn’t fully give treatment to the 
extent to which these norms and the cohesion they produce stems from the 
interdependence and interaction found within the system, i.e. the compliance may not 
exist simply because the international system exists. Clearly each of the theories offers 
explanations in many cases and often no supplement is needed. However, on aggregate, 
they represent a much richer body of work helpful to scholars of compliance than any one 

















XIII. COMPLIANCE IN THE GATT/WTO SYSTEM 
 
Given the diversity of opinions on compliance theory it comes as no surprise that 
scholarship of the issue is sometimes in contradiction. Essentially, the larger the system 
in question the more problems arise in the study of just what compliance is and how it 
should be measured. A good example is the case of the GATT/WTO system where one 
may observe an evolution of rules governing international trade through the various 
decades, and how the system coped with new challenges. While a discussion of the entire 
system is far beyond the scope of this work I discuss the GATT dispute system and how 
it changed into the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. The question arises, is the DSM 
effective and what kind of compliance with its decisions can be gathered so soon after its 
creation.  
The original General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade dispute settlement came out 
of the agreement’s Article XXIII which ambiguously determined procedures for 
consultation in cases where a state was acting in a way that nullified the benefits of the 
agreement. The inherent problem with this system was that GATT was always meant to 
make up a part of the International Trade Organization (ITO) which, in its draft charter, 
called for a strong, clear settlement process with the eventual ruling of the World Court 
should negotiations fail. As the ITO failed to materialize the GATT system was left with 
a makeshift process with unclear details of procedure governed entirely by what became 
customary practice within GATT.  
 Initially issues were settled through diplomatic negotiations that took place at the 
semiannual meetings of the members, then progressing to ad hoc committees, and 
eventually more permanent dispute committees. After 1955, it was decided that a dispute 
resolution panel of experts would settle these types of matters representing a change from 
a more legislative, multilateral process to a judicial one.  The right to suspend reciprocity 
was utilized only in one case, in 1953, when the Netherlands brought a case against the 
US regarding the restriction of dairy imports (as the Netherlands was not acting on its 
authorization to restrict wheat flour imports from the US due to its perceived 
ineffectiveness) and the panel evolved to focus heavily on mediation and negotiations, 
being at once criticized for not crafting more concrete rules or clarifying the 
understanding of existing norms. The GATT panel usually created a report on the issue at 
hand and would pass it on to the agreement’s Council, an entirely customary practice. 
The custom also followed that upon the consideration of the issue by the Council an 
approval of the panel’s report by consensus meant that the decision would become de 
facto binding whereas an absence of consensus would absolve the losing party of any 
need to comply. The main, and effectively lethal defect of this system was that since any 
member could raise objections at the Council’s discussion of the matter it effectively 
gave a everyone, even the member being “judged” a veto over the binding nature of the 
decision.  
 The 1980s saw greater refinement in the GATT process and the division of cases 
into two distinct but in fact completely unequal camps: non-violation cases which alleged 
some form of improper behavior in terms of the rules of the agreement (which saw about 
three to eight such cases in GATT history) and violation cases (which saw several 
hundred cases). While the system worked to the best of its ability it suffered from huge 
formational problems including ambiguity of goals, undefined procedures, problematic 
rules of participation of involved parties in the dispute process, and scattered systems of 
panel authority, among others. The Uruguay round of trade talks created the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding (DSU) aimed at resolving a lot of these problems. Particularly 
the new mechanism would unify the dispute settlement process out of the collection of 
panels, preventing the blocking of panels from addressing complaints, and simplify the 
panel structure. Because it was no longer possible to block the consensus adoption of the 
body’s decisions all decisions became consensus based and thus became binding on the 
losing party.  
 At the present, the WTO settlement mechanism is initiated by WTO states against 
other members and referred to consultations between the involved states. Panel members 
are chosen by all involved parties and rules are agreed upon. After arguments are 
presented consultations ensue and a report is crafted by the panel and reviewed for 
comments by involved parties. This report is submitted to the Dispute Settlement Body 
and adopted with a binding resolution. If a party is still unsatisfied with the decision it 
can proceed by referring it to the Appellate Body which has a final say on the issue. This 
system clearly engages states to negotiate as much as possible and is in support of the 
model fostering agreement through the bringing together of the parties involved. 
Theoretically a state can choose to do nothing and reject the verdict but it would not gain 
anything by that action under any of the theories as it would lose reciprocal agreements 
with other states. Under this model of an international agreement the “losing” outcome, 
or the worst case, is not being exploited but rather missing out on mutual benefits. As a 
result there is an inherent incentive to participate and states should be averse to either 
stretching out proceedings or not complying with the rulings. 48 
In the time since the creation of the WTO in 1995 several cases have been taken 
up that may shed some light on compliance within this obligatory system. While initially 
there were no objections over compliance with the mechanism from the major trading 
nations problems began to appear in 1998 with the EU and US argument over banana 
tariffs. The negotiations didn’t yield the desired result and already at its filing the issue 
was causing friction between the two trading superpowers for five years49.  The Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB) decided that the EU had behaved contrary to the agreed upon 
trade rules and mandated compliance with fair trade. The mechanism provides for a 
reasonable period of time when the report has to be implemented, either through mutual 
agreement or through the body’s decision depending on the practicability of the situation 
(this has usually meant ninety days on the early cases decided by the DSB). Members 
also have the option (though it is unclear exactly to what extent this is possible) to 
comply with the DSB decision or offer compensation to the other party for the breach of 
trade rules. In the case of the bananas the EU did not comply in a reasonable time and 
despite an appeal its tariffs system was in clear violation of the trade rules. The WTO 
authorized the US and other plaintiffs to levy trade sanctions on the EU over this issue 
and it was not until 2009 that the EU crafted an industrial relief package for the former 
European colonies to help offset their losses due to the mandatory lowering of the trade 
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tariffs. Upon its conclusion the case stretched back over 15 years of negotiations and 
while it had failed to yield compliance from the EU in a timely manner as envisioned by 
the WTO the end result did validate the process of negotiations and retaliatory removal of 
concessions.  
Other high profile cases offer a similar view of the mechanism, the 2002 US steel 
tariffs brought forward by President George W. Bush imposed heavy tariff restrictions on 
the import of steel into the US. Envisioned by the administration as a temporary measure 
to protect American steel industry jobs it faced high levels of criticism from major 
American trading partners like the EU and Japan, both of which invested heavily into 
making their steel industries profitable in the world market. The US was taken to the 
dispute panel at the WTO which ruled against the US tariffs in a major decision which 
was expected to spark a major trade war. Expecting that the decision by Bush was 
motivated by political strategy of preserving jobs in states like Michigan and 
Pennsylvania the EU responded with targeted sanctions at Michigan made cars and 
Florida oranges. As the WTO rejected the American appeal in the case and approved the 
over $2 billion sanctions that the EU proposed the US eventually reluctantly agreed to 
comply and withdrew the tariff by December of 2003, explaining that the intended effect 
had already been achieved and that their removal was in line with the idea at their 
conception.    
These two major cases may not necessarily be representative of the WTO dispute 
process but they point to a large problem that seems to doom questions of compliance on 
the global, macroeconomic level. Even if one is to omit the large issues with 
methodology50 the obstacles to monitoring of the extraordinarily complex state economic 
actions make monitoring a nearly impossible task. As will be presented in the maritime 
oil pollution case systems with multiple paths of failure for monitoring mechanisms often 
prove inadequate and the scope of actions is too broad here. One can argue that the US 
has “complied” with the WTO ruling based on the lifting of the tariffs on foreign imports. 
However, the US provides substantial subsidies to steel producers which entirely offset 
the low tariffs that permit the EU and Japanese steel producers to be competitive in the 
American market. The subsidy issue is at heart of a number of pending WTO cases and 
has presently stalled the latest round of WTO talks where a rift has emerged between 
developing and developed countries.  
As a result unless we eliminate every way for a state to offset the losses it suffers 
from lower tariffs on products entering its borders it’s extremely difficult to assess what 
“true” compliance is, i.e. to what extent has the intent of the ruling been followed. The 
best we can do is hope that states are motivated to follow the rules even if full scale 
quantitative evidence of this may not ever be available. We can also apply a very narrow 
definition of compliance where we equate it to the plaintiff’s satisfaction with the actions 
of the losing state in a dispute or settlement. In this assumption if a case has been settled 
by the WTO then one could say that the parties reached an agreement and the problem is 
no longer outstanding. This remains to be assessed given the fact that while early after 
                                                          
50 I have made only cursory mentions of this issue as it warrants scholarship that would comprise 
volumes of work. Methodology represents an overarching problem in most of the fields 
associated with studying compliance, be they international relations theory or legal terminology. 
Simply put the semantics of this dispute are beyond the scope of this work which seeks to 
maintain simple, commonly understandable, and to the greatest degree possible – 
interchangeable, terminology for the general presentation of the problem rather than a detailed 
accounting for use in comparative studies.  
1995 the WTO enjoyed high rates of settlement and resolution it has since then 
accumulated an increasing caseload of pending disputes.  
More accurate levels of true compliance with the intent of the agreement will be 
extremely difficult to determine until the conclusion of the WTO trade negotiations that 
specify the legality of national actions like subsidies and other domestic incentives to 
producers. Unless such restrictions are placed on governments the number of ways to 
gain favorable status within the system remains virtually unlimited. However, despite this 
seemingly indeterminate nature of the system there is some evidence that can be gathered 
regarding why it is that states participate and comply with the system. In a little under a 
decade since the creation of the WTO the US has be either a complainant or a defendant 
in 51% of all cases taken up by the body. Members of the European Community are the 
second most active participant, appearing in 40% of cases.51 This illustrates that the two 
largest trading blocks in the world do actively participate in the international agreement. 
Because both sides win and lose this would lend quite a lot of credibility to theories of 
compliance arguing for the power of interaction in treaties. Research suggests that states 
often go to the dispute settlement mechanism when they have a very high level of trade 
interdependence as “these countries have an especially strong incentive to reduce 
transaction costs and to make the rules of international trade transparent and consent.”52 
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DEFENDANT STATES IN WTO CASES 
 
COMPLAINTANT STATES IN WTO CASES 
 
The lower participation of smaller or poorer states has several possible 
explanations. One is that the rules of the international agreement do not align with the 
preferences of those states and instead are, as is often alleged, instruments of the wealthy 
states of the world. However, given that these same states are voluntary members of the 
trade regime it must indicate that even if they are not full participants they must 
recognize the agreement and see the possibility of deriving some benefit from it. If the 
agreement was not viewed as legitimate then the small states would not be members, 
instead 18% of cases are filed by developing nations against the developed world, 
showing that those states are willing to incur the costs of litigation for the purpose of 
resolving their dispute.  
 
A more likely explanation for lower participation of developing states stems from 
capacity constraints. As the WTO grows the legal resources needed to make sense of the 
various components of the system grow exponentially and some states struggle to allocate 
sufficient resources to make the most of it.  Data shows that while small states may not 
have the resources to pursue multiple large cases their participation in the system is not 
treated in any other way than that of large states. The complainants win approximately 
90% of cases in the WTO and this figure holds true both for developed and developing 
states. By all statistical accounts all members of the WTO enjoy equal treatment and 
receive similar benefits53 lending little evidence to theories citing existing state 
preferences as the impetus for participation in international agreements.  
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XIV. COMPLIANCE IN PRACTICE 
 
 Despite the challenges of establishing compliance on the international level there 
is much to be learned from particular cases of treaties which have been followed over a 
satisfactory period of time. One such example is Ronald Mitchell’s investigation and 
analysis of oil pollution at sea.54 Mitchell studied compliance with two major 
environmental treaties and compared results based on a large pool of data which showed 
large differences between the effects of the different provisions of each treaty. His 
conclusions about on the ground compliance fill the gap created by inconclusive 
scholarship on the macroeconomic level of this issue, and yield significant evidence that 
the architecture of international agreements carry a significant impact on the subsequent 
compliance.  
 Mitchell’s study deals with the oil pollution created by routine byproducts of oil 
shipping. While most people place their focus on large scale spills and other acute 
environmental disasters routine tanker discharges account for approximately two thirds of 
all oil pollution created by shipping (this includes major oil spills and ship sinkings).55 
This stems from the technicalities of oil transport, particularly that oil that is offloaded 
after transport leaves behind a residue that clings to the walls of the ship’s tanks and 
cannot be further dispensed of in port. Even though this oil represents a tiny fraction of 
the total cargo it can become quite significant when one considers both the capacity of 
modern oil tankers and the frequency of shipping. Upon leaving port the ship takes on 
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ballast for stability and subsequently discharges the seawater mixed with residue oil 
(called slops) before taking on more oil for the net trip.  This discharge amounts to 
significant amounts of oil being dumped into ocean or coastal waters and can amount to 
major environmental damage.  
 International efforts at regulating this problem have the longest history of any 
environmental international agreement. Debated as early as 1926 it became a focus of a 
1954 agreement at the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea 
by Oil (OILPOL).  Subsequently the agreement was refined and superseded by the 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships in 1973 and its 
protocol (MARPOL) in 197856.  Initial aims at regulating the pollution problem consisted 
of the designation of protected areas where discharge was prohibited. Under this plan 
ships could maintain their practice but away from places that would affect coastal life or 
cause the accumulation of large amounts of slops. Other measures early on specified 
maximum amounts of discharge per mile of ocean, a maximum amount per voyage, and 
the use of monitoring equipment to makes sure the water being discharged met delineated 
standards. Two convincing technological advancements also help with the problem. The 
first, segregated ballast tanks (SBT) installs a separate piping system for a portion of the 
ship’s tanks in a way that carries the ballast sea water away from the exposure to the 
residual oil. A second possibility, crude oil washing (COW) replaces seawater with crude 
oil for the cleaning of the ship’s tanks so that the residue mixes with the oil used for 
washing collecting more crude and reducing waste. However, this second method still 
exposes the seawater to the oil though it generates reduced discharge. A regular tanker 
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discharges approximately 248 tons of oil without any monitoring, SBT reduces that to 
168 tons while COW does to 100 tons. However, a combined SBT, COW system 
generates only 53 tons of discharge.  MARPOL mandated the use of both these systems 
in tankers with the International Maritime Organization (IMO) placed in charge of the 
collection of the information on compliance.  
 The years following OILPOL and MARPOL showed that absent incentives states 
do not report on their own compliance. Mitchell points out that non reporting does not 
necessarily mean non compliance however and the monitoring scheme has resulted in all 
types of reports, including those of non compliance, and failures to report despite existing 
compliance. 57 Unlike what one might expect the treaties did not ask whether facilities to 
discharge the slops existed in certain ports, rather it asked whether facilities adequate to 
trade existed, creating a nuanced incentive for ship captains to report on the state of the 
port. Essentially the concern from the shipping industry had to do with the extra time that 
the ship had to spend in the discharge facility getting rid of the slop. A simple system was 
expected to a be a failure due to this delay which is why the agreement pushed for the 
construction of facilities for the speedy resolution of this task. In the years following 
OILPOL and then MARPOL few reports were submitted and ship captains were 
concerned about the consequences of reporting ports to the treaty secretariat despite the 
incentive that doing so would reduce their time in port.  Without a clear enforcement 
mechanism and even despite heavy lobbying by states and organizations for the filing of 
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the reports only a fraction of states complied and often without any meaningful 
information. 58 
 In 1982 a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed by the fourteen 
European members of the agreement and called for the inspection of a quarter of tankers 
entering the states’ ports. The agreement called for a different report system, whereas the 
original recommendations asked for forms to be filled out and submitted the new scheme 
used telex machines to record basic information about the ship and the nature of their 
violation (if any). This data was then automatically relayed to computers and the port 
didn’t have to worry about any further action. Because the data is aggregated by the 
computer system into annual numbers and not disclosed by country outside of diplomatic 
sessions there exist no real incentives to avoid compliance. Data collection is also very 
simple and computerized and has resulted in every country reporting annually even if 
they have fallen short of the 25% threshold. The data below also shows that the level of 
development of a state significantly impacts whether it reports and falls in line with the 
Cheyses and other scholars’ theory that “developing states often have inadequate 
financial and administrative capacities and domestic concern to report” in addition to the 
fact that low capacity to report often reflects the low capacity to both construct facilities 
and to enforce.59 60 There is also a disparity between the views of governments and 
industry on this matter. Governments61 will want to bring compliance to a treaty they 
signed but most likely do not view it as a big enough issue to openly confront another 
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state over an unsubmitted report, therefore the incentive for diplomats to work on 
advancing the treaty is generally low and they do not derive any direct positive or 
negative benefits from the reporting. On the other hand the negative consequences of 
reporting to the shipping industry are large as tankers have to spend extra time in port 
complying with the procedures and undergoing inspections62 so the incentive there is to 
definitely not comply. Without reducing at least a portion of the negative incentive 
greater compliance is unlikely to be achieved. The data also shows that even in developed 
states the incentive to report when the reporting is time consuming is lower as the paper 
reports to the treaty secretariat historically hovered under half of those submitted to the 
computerized system.  
 
                                                          
62 Especially when this happens in ports with few inspectors and slow facilities. 
 
 
These cases seem to show that the level of self reporting of compliance in treaties 
is directly correlated to the ease of reporting, and the degree to which this is important 
rises sharply with the decreasing level of development of the state being asked for 
information.  Additionally, the MOU created summary reports to show progress with 
compliance, giving a dimension to the data that made participants feel a sense of success 
or failure, rather than the duplication of data by the IMO which did not improve on the 
available data and refrained from issuing opinions on progress or compliance, leaving 
participants with no sense of the consequences of their reporting. The MOU removed a 
complicated and ill defined bureaucratic obstacle to reporting and through the use of 





 There are also noticeable differences in the enforcement of particular provisions 
of OILPOL and MARPOL. Under OILPOL’s system violations occurred when a tanker 
either discharged oil in prohibited zones or discharged excessive amounts in other waters. 
The former was easily detectable but the latter, which constituted the vast majority of 
violations, was problematic. First the state had to establish that oil was discharged, 
measure the amounts vs. the mileage traveled, and prove that the discharge belonged 
entirely to the tanker in question.63 Even if fault was established the offender usually left 
the port long before the verdict was passed and without an effective transnational system 
of punishment the offender faced no adverse consequences. Authorities observed that 
they often had major problems policing coastal waters for non environmental violations, 
how were they expected to achieve monitoring and prosecution.64 As reliable technology 
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to monitor discharge was not even available until after MARPOL ship captains didn’t 
even have a way of measuring whether they were in violation of the quotas.  
 In 1969, an amendment to OILPOL changed the discharge quota to a maximum of 
1/15,000th of the total cargo capacity of the ship. This innovation allowed ports to detect 
how much oil was discharged rather than having to track the vessel on the ocean. Another 
monitoring issue resolved by treaty refinement was the permission granted to inspectors 
to board ships from different states. Previously illegal this permitted better inspections 
and included all vessels in the monitoring scheme. Despite these efforts, the improved 
detection did not translate into improved enforcement as states now dealt with the 
“adequate fines” question of the treaty. Undefined and lacking further terms it resulted in 
a complicated monitoring mechanism with almost negligible level of punishment.  
 Not much changed until the MARPOL conference and the subsequent protocol 
talks in 1978 which were meant to enter into force in 1983. The conference proposed 
broadening the enforcement capabilities of states in coastal water but this proposal was 
rejected after fears surfaced that jurisdiction issues would arise between port and flag 
states. However, a major innovation entered the treaty with the International Oil Pollution 
Prevention (IOPP) certificate which, valid for five years, was to be required of every 
tanker entering a port and was awarded based on the presence of monitoring technology. 
This meant that the the treaty shifted responsibility for the presence of compliant 
mechanisms on the tanker from the port authority looking to catch violators, to nonstate 
actors in each chain of the shipping business looking to ensure legality. Whether it was 
construction or insurance the industry was no longer free to leave the matter of pollution 
in the hands of the monitoring body. Ships without IOPP certificates were not legally 
allowed to leave the port until the deficiency was rectified. This approach effectively  
flipped the problem on its head, whereas previously the monitoring job was reliant on the 
efforts of multiple steps of the system, each without any particular incentive to action, it 
was now up to several different components of the industrial system to make sure that the 
IOPP was present and valid or the tanker would lose money sitting in port under 
detention. The potential loses to a tanker were now substantially greater whereas the costs 
of compliance were already present in the construction and certification phase, far 
removed from the actual work of the tanker itself. Traditional monitoring of egregious 
actions still fell to the government but the simpleobligation to verify and confirm IOPP 
certificate resolved the bulk of the cumbersome detection work that fell beyond the 
capacity of most states. 65 
                                                          





 The issue can thus be characterized according to two mechanisms: discharge 
limits and equipment standards. Discharge limits were a deterrence based strategy with 
limited incentives to comply and a strong economic incentive not to. They failed to 
properly match the actions and rules needed for compliance with the capacity of actors to 
detect and punish violations. States responsible for monitoring (port states) had virtually 
no means of prosecuting discharge violators while states that did have that ability (flag 
states) had virtually no incentive to emphasize punishment as the violations were not 
directly affecting them. Changing the discharge measuring standards positively affected 
the ability of port states to detect violations but left the legal prosecution and incentive 
questions in the same kind of gray area as they were initially. While the compliance with 
these rules has risen there is no evidence that it was anything other than a correlation to 
the rise in compliance with the subsequent equipment regime, thus representing an 
example of coincidental compliance rather than a treaty induced type.66  The push for 
equipment standards was not genuinely made until the very late 1970s when countries 
decided to require SBTs and other equipment tha comprised the IOPP monitoring 
scheme. Treaty negotiators were prudent to compromise on the requirements for current 
tankers while maintaining that newly constructed ships would have to abide by all the 
established rules. As a result tankers at the time had a choice of implementing SBT or 
COW systems while new construction mandated both. This was important as SBTs were 
generally economically disadvantageous, costing approximately $1,500 per tanker trip 
while COW was hugely positive, saving approximately $9,000. Previous numbers 
showed that both had to be implemented to have the best effect.  Additionally, while the 
discharge fines routinely averaged below $10,000 the cost of an entire tanker being 
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detained in port until the non compliance was rectified was extraordinarily high to any 
tanker owner. Data shows that tankers were not being fitted with SBT before MARPOL 
and that the retrofitting largely took place when the ship was being already worked on for 
the economic incentives derived from COW.67 The adoption of SBT even in cases where, 
due to the presence of COW, it was no longer necessary, shows that treaty induced 
compliance rose sharply due to the structure of the MARPOL protocol. The equipment 
standards no longer relied on forcing states to improve their detection and monitoring 
systems and made treaty compliance significantly easier and more practical. Treaty 
compliance piggybacked on existing industrial monitoring infrastructure, where countries 
already spend significant amounts of money. Port officials, insurance companies, and 
lawyers, were better suited to assure that all the appropriate practices were being 
followed than aerial reconnaissance aircraft and invasive boardings by inspectors. This 
case clearly shows that the design of a treaty carries a large impact on the degree to 





                                                          




XV. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
 
 Compliance remains a difficult area of study. Its methodology is complicated and 
problematic and measuring it across a large body of international law proves highly 
challenging. While the research surveyed universally struggled to establish facts about 
international laws beyond particular cases studies no conclusive explanation for why 
states obey international law currently exists. Similarly, no single identifiable component 
of international agreements seems to elicit perfect compliance and as is the case with 
other aspects of international relations theory. Complementary approaches seem to work 
best when one studies diverse cases.  
 Following the overview of the evolution of international legal theory on 
compliance one has to suspect that some perspectives offer more explanatory power than 
others. The reasons for compliance do not appear to be universal and often the 
investigations have led to a theoretical black hole where many variables are able to 
provide some degree of explanation, but are not sufficient. If, however, one makes certain 
reasonable assumptions and tries, as much as possible, to exclude those variables that are 
exogenous to the agreements themselves it may be possible to observe some faint 
patterns of explanatory theory. On the world scale, the case of compliance in the 
GATT/WTO system proved far more elusive than expected. While it may be the case that 
the nascent nature of the WTO system, and thus something of a short institutional history 
in terms of its major dispute organ, may be to blame for limited data sets, the evidence 
emerging out of the old GATT system has been as confusing and inconclusive as 
anything found in the world of human rights or environmental treaties. Voluntary 
agreements have a record of indeterminate implementation that can be well reflected by 
realist perspectives on the subject. This is certainly true the further one goes back in 
history where preferences shaped what agreements states entered into and neither the 
letter of, nor the intent of, the “international law” was followed when it did not benefit 
the power structure of the state. In the post WWII world, however, and certainly more 
broadly after the end of the Cold War, norms, regulations, and laws have evolved in a 
new way.  
 What is the status of compliance with WTO decisions? It’s difficult to determine 
and depending on how the question is phrased it can range from 0% to 100%. Whatever 
the actual outcome of WTO decisions there is a clear conclusion: states participate in the 
WTO system beyond the simple standing of selfish preferences. This is evident in the 
increasing participation of states, the active engagement in disputes, and the choice of the 
WTO DSM as a preferred means of resolving disputes over traditional trade wars. 
Additionally, there are broad definitions of compliance that are undeniably satisfied by 
the actions of the losing states. Tariffs are lifted after complaints, actions are taken, 
methods are changed. Whether they are offset by other actions is in a strict sense 
irrelevant because the agreement itself is followed. This gives the WTO, at least, a 
marginal level of legitimacy as a forum for, at the very least, discussion, if not, at the 
very least, some degree of power in the international trade regime.  
 Participation in the WTO system gives credibility to the perspective of 
international law focusing on interactions and process. Scholars like Guzman and 
Simmons argue that interdependence brings states to resolve their disputes through the 
DSM but the banana wars and US steel cases do demonstrate the power of these norms to 
change the actors that participate in them. Neither strict liberal nor realist theories lend 
good explanations to the outcome of those two cases. Cooperation was not the best 
outcome in either unless one dips their toes in the argument that it’s cooperation in the 
long term and the overall benefit that matters. Similarly, power does nothing to explain it 
as not only did the two largest trading superpowers lose their preference but they also lost 
prestige in the exchange. But the reality was such that both lost, and both appealed and 
lost again, and complied, and most importantly went back to the system and their usual 
participation in it right afterwards. No boycotts of the WTO or secessions from the trade 
regime were proposed even if sensationalism does make everyone feel that the world is 
on the brink of agreement disintegration at all times.  
 It is disappointing that despite very good, ambitious, and comprehensive studies 
of some issues in the WTO system the compliance question cannot be satisfactorily 
answered. It’s almost possible to understand the frustration of a newly crafted treaty that, 
after much time invested, is not on a clear path to success. The expectations for 
compliance should be good and the system does appear to function even if it is riddled 
with questions and potential kinks to be worked out. In the absence of the further trade 
talks that stipulate exactly how greater transparency can be introduced to states there 
exists, unfortunately, potential for increasingly inventive ways to elude compliance with 
an agreement should a party choose to. A more likely outcome is that transparency will 
grow out of negotiations because other members have the highest incentive to ensure 
compliance with decisions and may use the resolution of disputes as bargaining chips 
effectively swapping either promises or transparency of implementation in return for 
reciprocal agreements. Whatever the outcome there is sufficient evidence that the WTO 
system as a whole promotes compliance even if the record of specific cases remains to be 
comprehensively determined.   
 On the ground the question can be answered in a very different way. Compliance 
with particular treaties is not as difficult to establish and despite the need to work on a 
case by case basis solid scholarship exists with good evidence and useful conclusions. 
Work across treaty types warrants the same kind of caution one might expect with the 
global trade regime problem but treaties of similar type can be expected to have similar 
features and lessons even if their design might not be interchangeable. The evidence 
gathered from the work on environmental treaties by Ronald Mitchell clearly points to 
strong conclusions that are not easily discredited by competing perspectives. While the 
conclusions may sound all too much as if “it depends” there is sufficient material to show 
that the architecture of the treaty is the largest determinant of whether it is complied with. 
Particularly provisions dealing with monitoring, detection, and enforcement warrant 
closest scrutiny as they, far more than ideological components, determine whether a 
treaty works or not.  
 The OILPOL and MARPOL case study offers many lessons but from the 
theoretical perspective none are more important than the fact that it bridges the ideas of 
power and preferences with those of cooperation and process to show that compliance 
can be achieved when one understands that not only is every treaty different but every 
provision needs to be designed in a particular way. Preferences matter in that the overall 
volition of a state to take up an issue in the agreement determines what level of resources 
it allocates to the treaty. Environmental issues may not necessarily win billions of dollars 
from national legislatures for monitoring making certain designs in the treaty foolish. 
How is a treaty like OILPOL supposed to be effective if there are no funds for a fleet of 
coastal vessels and planes to monitor adherence to its provisions? Conversely, a national 
defense treaty may have the luxury of greater monitoring demands as the possible threat 
to the survival of the state will surely elicit a greater number of assets committed to it.  
 In this case there was large variance between the design of provisions even 
though they were part of the same treaty and addressed the same problem. This fact alone 
should hint at large problems with claims of universality of treaty design. The radical 
shifts in industry behavior between the different standards are evident of treaty induced 
compliance and are not very well explained by other variables. This would further point 
to the credibility of the process based theory of international law where the interaction of 
actors regarding this issue created norms that not only resulted in better design but also 
percolated down to influence compliance standards on the microeconomic level, in port 
offices and at shipping insurance companies. 
That rules caused change in the behavior of states and industries is clear, before 
MARPOL no tankers installed SBTs and no port detained tankers for non compliance 
with environmental regulations. Several factors made the difference in the designs of the 
provisions that failed and succeeded as part of OILPOL and MARPOL. Ease of reporting 
was instrumental in the dissemination of information and the increase in the voluntary 
reporting of violations. Because the successful networks were computerized, provided 
feedback, and worked to both provide and gather information they reduced the incentives 
to non compliance. Drawing on a larger group of actors the widely available information 
provided everyone from ship captains to port operators and inspectors with useful data 
whenever they wanted. This is in stark contrast to the WTO cases where monitoring of 
entire industries or sometimes even entire economies is an impossible task. The oil cases 
show that the more avenues for failure in the monitoring mechanism the lower the 
chances for compliance.  
Mitchell theorizes that effective treaty compliance stems from the ability to fill 
the gaps in what he calls the “strategic triangle of compliance.”68 Pictured with each end 
of the triangle as either “Legal Authority,” “Appropriate Incentives,” or “Practical 
Ability” this concept points to the need for complementary action to stem from any treaty 
mechanism. If two ends of the triangle exist then the aim of the treaty should be the third 
one, only then will the treaty have sufficient economic and legal incentives to motivate 
action in a way that is greater than the motivation to escape compliance.  Perfect 
compliance will often prove impossible; rather, practical and feasible demands should be 
coupled with smart incentives to motivate change. Because different treaties focus on 
different actors provisions should also cater to certain audiences. The dissemination of 
information in treaties on arms control may not be as important as that in environmental 
accords because non state actors play a smaller role in the former while holding a strong 
position in the latter. When crafting a treaty diplomats need to ask fundamentally 
different questions, concerning themselves less with what needs to be done and rather 
with who makes the difference and how to best incentive them.  
Beyond these incentives treaties should make use of existing forms of monitoring 
and enforcement rather than inventing new ones. The enforcement mechanism for almost 
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every treaty is quite complicated, be that ocean water monitoring for pollution or the 
inspection of agricultural policies in large multilateral trade agreements. The practice of 
“piggybacking” on existing industries of enforcement – areas of industry already 
regulated – brings established cultures of compliance to bear on whatever the compliance 
challenge might be. By introducing a part of the treaty into an existing compliance or 
monitoring system the chances that inadequate resources will be allocated to the treaty 
are reduced and as inspectors or experts are already at work on one measure their training 
or start up time will be greatly diminished with an expanded job description, rather than 
the creation of a whole new body of monitoring. Another prescription involves the 
removal of legal barriers to enforcement.  Without effective fines and precise treaty 
language the legal consequences of non compliance become irrelevant and the incentives 
to comply diminish to zero. The legal authorization to monitor actors from other states 
and place fines on all those party to an agreement regardless of state of origin are 
important features that foster the effective application of treaties. As can be seen there are 
numerous lessons to be learned from successful treaties that find applicability in other 
cases. As has been mentioned before issues, treaties, and even provisions within the same 
agreements cannot be crafted in a universal, generalized way if they are to elicit desirable 
levels of compliance. The close evaluation of the appropriate means of implementing the 
provisions of international agreements saves the time lost on the continuous revision of 
language to address failed means of enforcement.  
Based on these case studies there is an observable degree of impact that 
negotiations and interaction have on the participants in the international trade regime. 
States may enter the system with their particular preferences but the treaties discussed 
have, to varying degrees, elicited compliance from actors that was not necessarily aligned 
with their direct preference. It can be argued that these preferences were also reshaped 
due to the process, as is evidenced by the changed stance of ship building countries in 
response to shifting standards on tanker construction. Process based legal theory offers 
convincing explanatory power for why nations behave the way they do as the system 
reshapes and is reshaped through the interactions of actors over time to yield norms that 
may substantially differ from the original designs. The GATT system evolved from a 
means of fostering trade to a behemoth with its own jurisdiction and powers, capable of 
power sometimes comparable to the members that make it possible. Similarly OILPOL 
began with big ambitions but modest design and through its subsequent reincarnations 
underwent large, and in some areas, total changes in how it was structured, what it sought 
to control, and what power was given to it to achieve these goals. The design of these 
agreements, the presence and power of the process of these negotiations and the norms 
they revolve around is well illustrated in these cases and serves as a further piece of the 
puzzle in the question of why states comply with international agreements.  
On aggregate the design of the agreement is clearly consequential on all levels of 
international trade. Globally, patterns of compliance remain elusive as loopholes and 
complexities make the system difficult to monitor and study yielding only a partially 
satisfying answer to the question of compliance. Despite this hindrance, it can be 
concluded that this falls precisely in line with the conclusion on regime design, as the 
reason for the problems of compliance on the global scale can be attributed to the vague, 
poorly structured agreement that underpins the global trade regime. The changes in the 
settlement of disputes between GATT and the WTO are a reflection of the refinement of 
language and process in the new agreement and come out of the direct need to address 
this area of weakness. The current treaty has many other weak areas which the ongoing 
trade negotiations are slowly working to eliminate. A satisfactory study of compliance on 
this level remains elusive, and will likely stay that way until states find a means of 
tackling the immense complexity of the global economic system. Until then, the WTO 
agreement remains an improved, but imprecise text which lacks clear and practical means 
of implementation, monitoring, and enforcement. Similarly, the analysis of the 
compliance with oil shipping regulations yields further evidence to the argument for the 
importance of design. In this case efforts to address capacity and enforcement led to 
major changes in the compliance with the international agreement. When easier means of 
monitoring, practical economic incentives, and a clearer legal framework were 
established compliance rose in response to the strengthened agreement. These cases show 
that regardless of scale the design of international agreements is directly tied to the levels 
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